Missouri Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 4 Fall 1999

Article 5

Fall 1999

Assessing the Best Interests of the Child: Missouri Declares That
a Homosexual Parent Is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody
Heidi C. Doerhoff

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Heidi C. Doerhoff, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child: Missouri Declares That a Homosexual Parent
Is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody, 64 MO. L. REV. (1999)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Doerhoff: Doerhoff: Assessing the Best Interests of the Child:

Notes

Assessing the Best Interests of the Child:
Missouri Declares that a Homosexual Parent
Is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody
JA.D. v. F.J.D
I. INTRODUCTION
In formal child custody disputes, the voices of those at the center of the
controversy, the children, are rarely heard.2 Their parents, who otherwise are

presumed to act in their best interests, battle one another in legal proceedings
that reward the parent who more persuasively portrays the deficiencies of the
other's parenting skills. Because the children, especially the very young, have
no adequate basis for making judgments about their long-term well-being, the
state acts asparenspatriaewhile their parents are adversaries. 4 Through its laws
and decision makers, the state attempts to ensure that the final custody
arrangement is guided by the best interests of the child.
Judges charged with resolving custody disputes are faced with an
exceptionally difficult, if not quixotic, task. To implement the best interests
standard, they must determine where a particular child's interests lie-by sorting
through conflicting parental and expert testimony, by deducing legislative

1. 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998).
2. Many state custody statutes list a child's wishes as to custody as a factor to
consider. See infra note 38. Yet, often for good reason, the child's wishes are not
determinative. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 954 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the court will follow child's preference only if other evidence concerning
child's best interests are consistent with that preference).
Courts sometimes provide representation for children independent of their parents
or custodians by appointing a guardian ad litem. Even in those circumstances, the
guardian ad litem is responsible for reporting the facts concerning her ward and not for
voicing the child's preferences. See John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's
Rights, 1991 BYU L. REv. 307, 333-39.
3. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw 620 (3d ed. 1998).
4. "Parenspatriae,
literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role
of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for
themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971); Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y.
1925) (Cardozo, J.) (describing the New York common law approach to parenspatriae
as requiring the judge to put himself in the position of"a wise, affectionate and careful
parent"). See generally George B. Curtis, The Checkered CareerofParensPatriae: The
State as Parent or Tyrant, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 895 (1976) (discussing the development
and use of the doctrine from its early English origins to modem American usage).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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directives from general statutory standards offering little specific guidance, and
by giving due consideration to the parent-child relationship.' The burden on the
court is tremendous, yet its obligation is equally great. If it fails to fulfill its
duty, the court risks long-lasting and serious harms to the child, which may in
turn affect society generally.
Given the wide range of familial situations, courts have found that myriad
factors bear in differing degrees on the interests and welfare of children. The
potential relevance of one such factor, a parent's involvement in a homosexual
relationship, has been hotly debated before the courts, among legal scholars,6 and
by social scientists.7 The Missouri Supreme Court recently had the opportunity

5. The Supreme Court has characterized the right of parents to raise and care for
their children as fundamental. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Parental rights can be
terminated only if compelling circumstances, such as parental unfitness, are shown by
clear and convincing evidence. See Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody,
Discretion,and Sexual Orientation,46 AM. U. L. REv. 841, nn.2-4 (1997). As Professor

Strasser has noted, however, the constitutional protections for parental rights "are less
robust than first might appear" because "states have much discretion in determining the
criteria for actual or presumed unfitness" and "because custody and visitation awards
often depend on the credibility, temperaments, and personalities of those vying for
custody, trial courts are given much discretion when applying the relevant criteria." Id.
at 842.
6. See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warringwith Wardle: Morality, Social
Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 253; Susan J. Becker,
Court-CreatedBoundariesBetween a Visible LesbianMother and Her Children, 12 WIs.
WOMEN'S L.J. 331 (1997); Kathryn Kendell, The Custody Challenge: DebunkingMyths
AboutLesbian and Gay Parentsand Their Children,20 FAM. ADVOC. 21 (1997); Arthur
S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Families and the Law: A ProgressReport, 21 FORDHAM

URB. L.J. 927 (1994); Stephen B. Pershing, "EntreatMe Not to Leave Thee": Bottoms
v. Bottoms and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents,3 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 289 (1994); Ruthann Robson, ThirdPartiesand the Third Sex: Child Custody
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1377 (1994); Julie Shapiro, Custody and
Conduct: How the Law FailsLesbian and GayParentsand Their Children, 71 IND. L.J.
623 (1996); Annamay T. Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers 1I: Long Night'sJourney into Day,
8 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 219 (1985); Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child
Custody When One Parentis Homosexual orLesbian-An EmpiricalStudy, 23 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 711 (1989); Lynn D. Wardle, The PotentialImpact ofHomosexual Parenting
on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833; Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual
Parenting: Child Custody andAdoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (1989); Juliet A.
Cox, Comment, Is the Best Interest of the Child Being Sacrificed to Maintain Societal

Homogeneity?, 59 Mo. L. REV. 775, 792 (1994); David M. Rosenblum, Comment,

Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents,36 VILL. L. REv. 1665 (1991); Note, Out
of the Closet and Into the Courts: Homosexual Fathersand Child Custody, 93 DICK. L.
REv. 401 (1989).
7. See infra note 157.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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to consider the issue in J.A.D. v. F.J.D.8 The court held that it was not error for
a court to consider the effect of a parent's homosexual misconduct on the
children, but that homosexual parents are not ipso facto unfit for custody of their
children.9
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
The custody of three minor children became the focus of contention when
J.A.D. sought to dissolve her nine-year marriage to F.J.D.' ° J.A.D. petitioned
the court to award joint legal custody and to designate her as the children's
principal physical custodian because she was their primary caretaker" during the
marriage. 2 F.J.D. sought sole custody and restrictions on J.A.D.'s visitation
rights because she had "entered significant, intense, open and blatant lesbian
relationships" since their children's birth and because he could better provide for
13
them.
Following an eight-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court dissolved the
marriage, made custody determinations, and established a visitation schedule. 4
It determined that the best interests of the children would be served by granting
F.J.D. sole custody and restricting J.A.D.'s visitation rights. 5 The court directed

8. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1998).
9.Id. at 339.
10. Id.at 337; Delong v. Delong, No. WD52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *2 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 1998). J.A.D. also sought relief from terms of an antenuptial agreement
that precluded her from obtaining any of the marital property. Delong, 1998 WL 15536,
at *1-*2.
11. Like courts in many other states, Missouri courts have viewed the primary
caretaker role as an important factor to consider in awarding custody. See, e.g., Leach
v. Leach, 660 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See generally, Andrea G. Nadel,
Annotation, Primary CaretakerRole of Respective Parents As Factor in Awarding
Custody of the Child, 41 A.L.R.4th 1129 (1999).
12. Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *2. J.A.D. had begun a career as a school teacher
prior to her marriage to F.J.D. in 1985. After the couple began to have children, J.A.D.
primarily stayed at home to care for the children and for F.J.D.'s son from a prior
marriage. Id. at *1-*2. During the marriage, F.J.D. worked as a full-time attorney, and
then later as the CEO of his family's bridge-steel fabrication business. Id.
13. Id. at *2. At the trial, J.A.D. testified to having one nonsexual and three sexual
affairs with other women since she concluded her marriage was irreparable in 1991. Id.
One affair occurred after she and F.J.D. were separated. Id. F.J.D. also testified to
having a sexual affair with a woman following separation. Id.
14. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo. 1998).
15. Specifically, the trial court relied on F.J.D.'s greater stability, nearby and close
extended family, and his greater likelihood of promoting a good relationship between the
children and other parent Id. The court found that J.A.D. displayed a negative attitude
toward F.J.D. that adversely impacted the children, and that J.A.D. immaturely sought
new love relationships and "enmesh[ed] the children in her lovers' lives." Id. The trial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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J.A.D. to keep "all aspects of the homosexual lifestyle" away from the children
and prohibited her from exposing them to any persons known by her to be
lesbian (with the exception, of one longtime friend) and to any other unrelated
females with whom she might be living.' 6 Furthermore, the trial court ordered
that the two eldest children, who were unaware of the nature of their mother's
relationships, be informed by J.A.D. of her "lesbianism" in a "telling" session
monitored by the guardian ad litem. 7
J.A.D. appealed the custody and visitation rulings, claiming that the
evidence showed she would have made a better custodian. 8 She argued that the
trial court had unconstitutionally based its decision solely on her sexual
orientation and that the court-ordered "telling" session and the limitations on her
visitation rights were improper. 9
In considering J.A.D.'s appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District of Missouri adopted a nexus test,2" which requires an
evidentiary connection, or nexus, between a parent's sexual conduct and its
impact on the child's welfare in order for evidence of the parent's conduct to be
relevant to the custody determination."' The court then held that the trial court
improperly awarded custody and restricted visitation based on J.A.D.'s
homosexual conduct without evidence of its impact on the children.22 After the
appellate court issued its slip opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court granted
transfer, which divested the appellate court's decision of precedential effect.23
Following transfer, F.J.D. moved to strike J.A.D.'s brief.24 The motion
alleged violations of Rule 84.04(c), which requires a fair and concise statement
of the facts, and Rule 84.04(h), which requires page references to the legal file

court also pointed to many findings that were related to J.A.D.'s sexual orientation and
conduct but did not include findings connecting J.A.D.'s conduct to its effects on the
children. Id.; Delong v. Delong, No. WD52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan. 20, 1998). For example, the trial court noted that J.A.D. engaged in a "promiscuous
series of four homosexual affairs," she denied and concealed "her adulterous lesbian
activity," and she intended to continue exposing her children to her "lesbian lovers." Id.
16. J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 340; Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *2-*3.
17. J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 338; Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *3.
18. J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 338-39; Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *3.
19. J.A.D., 978 S.W.2d at 339; Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *3.
20. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
21. Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *11.
22. Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan.
20, 1998).
23. See Philmon v. Baum, 865 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("The
decision of the court of appeals in a case subsequently transferred is of no precedential
effect."). Although the court of appeal's lengthy slip appellate opinion was mooted by
transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, this Note makes reference to it to help illuminate
some issues.
24. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. 1998).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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or transcript for all statements of fact and argument." The supreme court
sustained the motion with respect to the statement of facts and granted J.A.D.
leave to file a new brief.26 F.J.D. then moved to strike J.A.D.'s substitute brief,
alleging continued violations of Rule 84.04(c) and additional violations of Rule
84.04(d), which requires that the points relied on briefly and concisely state the
actions or rulings sought to be reviewed and why they are erroneous.27 The court
took this motion with the case, found that J.A.D.'s points relied on failed to meet
the requirements of Rule 84.04(d), and reviewed the trial court's judgment only
for plain error.28
In a per curiam opinion, the court held that the trial court did not plainly err
in making its custody determination because the decision was not based solely
on J.A.D.'s homosexual status; that J.A.D.'s challenge to the "telling" session
was moot because it had already taken place; and that the limitations on J.A.D.'s
visitation rights were overbroad because the restrictions should apply only to
persons whose presence might be contrary to the best interests of the children.29

Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When a child's parents divorce or otherwise form separate households,3" it
must be determined whether one or both parents should be responsible for
making decisions about her health, education, and welfare,3 whether she should
reside solely with her father or with her mother or should spend significant
periods residing with each. 2 If it is decided that she will reside solely with one
parent, it must also be determined whether and under what conditions she will
spend time with the other parent.3

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 338-40.
29. Id. at 339-40.
30. This discussion assumes that both parents wish to maintain contact with their
child and that at least one parent is a fit custodian.
31. This question relates to the legal custody of the child. When a court awards
"joint legal custody," both parents share the decision making rights, responsibilities, and
authority relating to the health, education, and welfare of the child. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.375(l)(2) (Supp. 1998).
32. This question relates to the physical custody of the child. When a court awards
one parent "sole physical custody," the child will reside with that parent alone. When
a court awards the parents "joint physical custody," the child will spend significant, but
not necessarily equal, time residing with or being supervised by each parent. See, e.g.,
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(l)(3) (Supp. 1998).
33. This is usually called visitation. Unlike custody, courts generally recognize a
parental right to visitation or presume that it is in the child's best interests. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993) ("Unlike custody, visitation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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A. Principlesof Child Custody Adjudication
When parents cannot agree about a child's custody, they submit their claims
to court for adjudication.34 After considering the parties' evidence and, if
appropriate, the evidence of any individuals appointed by the court to represent
the child's interests, the court resolves the dispute according to the "best
interests of the child."35 Because there is a strong preference for

between a child and a noncustodial parent isnot merely a privilege of the noncustodial
parent, but a right of the child."). In many states, including Missouri, visitation usually
can be denied or restricted only if it will be detrimental to or will endanger the child.
See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.400 (Supp. 1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/607(c)

(West Supp. 1999) ("[T]he court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it
finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or
emotional health."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(a) (1997 & Supp. 1998) (entitling a
parent not granted custody to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds that
visitation would seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health); In re Marriage of McKay, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 16, 1996) (stating that Minnesota utilizes an "endangerment standard" in
determining visitation restrictions).
34. Child custody adjudication is relatively rare because parties often initially agree
about who should have custody or they settle their disagreements before going to court.
For example, it is estimated that approximately 78 percent of parents agree from the
beginning in divorce cases. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 621 (citing Robert H.
Mnookin & Eleanor E. Maccoby, Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial
ArrangementsAre ParentsNegotiating?,in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 52

(S. Sugarman & H. Kay, eds., 1990)).
35. In nearly every state, the "best interests of the child" standard has been
incorporated explicitly by statute or recognized legislatively by listing factors to be used
in determining a child's best interests. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Supp. 1998)
(directing the court to determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child
and listing factors); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 1996) (directing the court to
award the custody arrangement that is in the best interests of child); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-403(A) (West Supp. 1998) (listing factors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101
(Michie Supp. 1999) (stating the best interests standard); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West
Supp. 1999) (stating standard and listing factors); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10124(1.5)(a) (West 1999) (listing factors); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(b)(1) (West
1995) (stating standard); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (listing
factors); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-91 1(a)(5)(A)-(Q) (1981) (listing factors); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(3) (West Supp. 1999) (listing factors); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (1999)
(describing duty of the court to ascertain which parent will promote the best interests of
the child); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(1) (Supp. 1998) (stating standard); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-717 (1996) (listing factors); 750 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West Supp. 1999)
(listing factors); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie Supp. 1999) (same); IOWA CODE
§ 598.1.1 (1997) (defining best interests); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(3) (1997 &
Supp. 1998) (stating standard); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(a)-(i) (Michie Supp.
1998) (listing factors); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 131 (West Supp. 1999) (directing court
to award custody according to best interests); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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placing a child in the custody of at least one of her parents,36 the trier usually

1653.3(A)-(O) (West Supp. 1998) (listing factors); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West
Supp. 1999) (best interests standard); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1999) (listing
factors); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2)(a)-(d) (1998) (best interests standard); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 125.480 (1997) (stating that the "sole consideration of the court is the best
interest of the child"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1992) (directing courts to award
custody as shall be most conducive to children's benefit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9

(Michie 1994) (best interests standard); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1999) (directing the court to enter custody orders "as, in the court's discretion,

justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective
parties and to the best interests of the child"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1995)
(requiring custody orders to be made "as will best promote the interest and welfare of the
child"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1997) (best interests standard); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.21(A) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (directing court orders for children to be
made "as in their best interests"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1999)
(listing preferences for custody arrangements that should be resolved according to the
best interests of the child); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (1997) (listing factors); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5312 (West 1991) (best interests standard); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-516(d)(2) (1996) (listing factors that should not be considered in determining a child's best
interests); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that court may make
determinations that, "from the circumstances of the parties and the nature ofthe case and
the best spiritual as well as other interests of the children may be fit, equitable and just");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 25-4-45 (Michie 1999) (stating that court shall be guided by
"what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect to the child's temporal
and mental and moral welfare"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (1996) (best interests
standard); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 1996) (mandating that child's best
interests "shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues
of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-310 (Supp. 1999) (best interests standard); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (1989 & Supp.
1999) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2.B (Michie Supp. 1999) (stating that "the court
shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child"); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.24(2)(b) (Supp. 1998) (best interests standard); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113(p)
(Michie 1999) (stating that "[c]ustody shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the
child"). See also Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 670-71 (Md. 1998) (recognizing
best interests standard judicially). But see ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989 & Supp. 1996)
("[T]he court may give the custody and education of the children ofthe marriage to either
father or mother, as may seem right and proper, having regard to the moral character and
prudence of the parents and the age and sex of the children."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ 28 (West 1998) ("[Tjhe court may make such judgment as it considers expedient
relative to the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties .... ");
MICH. COMp. LAvs ANN. § 552.16(1) (West Supp. 1999) ("[T]he court may enter such
orders as it considers just and proper concerning the care, custody, and support of the
minor children of the parties."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (1994 & Supp. 1999)
(stating that the court may "in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties and the nature of the case, [make custody, care, and maintenance determinations]

as may seem equitable and just").
36. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 628 nn.19-24 (identifying the two assumptions
underlying the strong and widespread preference for awarding custody to legally
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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focuses on comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parenting
skills of the child's mother and father and the home environments in which they
propose to place her.37 The child's preferences as to custody, provided38 she is old
enough to form them, may be relevant but rarely are determinative.
Unlike most other forms of adjudication, child custody determinations
under the best interests standard require courts to assess the "attitudes,
dispositions, capacities, and shortcomings" of the parties in order to predict how
they will act in the future.39 Courts are given little statutory guidance in
determining what significance should be attached to any particular characteristic
or factor.4" For the most part, they may consider any matter that seems relevant

recognized parents as (1)the presumption that a child is better off with such parent than
with a more distant relative or stranger, and (2) the recognition of a parental right to the
custody and companionship of a child).
37. See In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ("Fitness for
custodial responsibilities is largely a comparative matter.") (emphasis added).
38. Statutes that list the factors a court should consider in assessing the best
interests of the child frequently list as a factor the child's preference as to his or her
custodian. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375(2)(8) (Supp. 1998). Some states, by
statute, direct the court to give more weight to the wishes of a child who has reached a
certain age. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (Michie Supp. 1999) (distinguishing
children who are 14 years old or older); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 1997) (same).
Georgia seems alone in giving children who are at least 14 years old the right to select
their custodial parent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (1999).
39. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctions in the
Face ofIndeterminacy,39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226, 250-51 (1975).
40. Even when statutes list factors for courts to consider in assessing the best
interests of the child, they provide little guidance or constraint to the trial court. They
typically list nonexclusive factors and/or do not attach weight to the factors listed. Often
courts are directed to look at all other relevant factors and to use their discretion to
evaluate the individual circumstances of each case. Missouri's statute is typical. Section
452.375 provides that:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents as to custody and the proposed
parenting plan submitted by both parties;
(2) The needs of the child for a frequent, continuing and meaningful
relationship with both parents and the ability and willingness of parents to
actively perform their functions as mother and father for the needs of the
child;
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, continuing
and meaningful contact with the other parent;
(5) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community;
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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under the circumstances, unless the matter is specifically excluded by statutory
or constitutional directive.4" Courts also have very broad discretion in
formulating an order appropriate to the factual and legal circumstances.42

Once custody has been adjudicated under the best interests standard, the
custodial arrangements can be changed only through a petition for modification.

In light of a child's need for stable custodial and emotional ties, the moving party
generally must meet a substantial burden of persuasion in showing that a change
is necessary or expedient for the child's welfare. 3

any history of abuse of any individuals involved.... Custody and visitation
rights shall be ordered in a manner that best protects the child and the parent
or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence
from harm;
(7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principal residence of
the child; and
(8) The wishes of a child as to the child's custodian.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (Supp. 1998).
41. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
42. Whether the child's best interests are better served by granting trial judges
more or less discretion is a question that has been the subject of considerable scholarly
analysis and debate. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best
Interests of the Child, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1987) (criticizing the best interests standard
as indeterminate and as lacking sufficient guidance in light of inherent limitations in
judicial capabilities); Mary Ann Glendon, FixedRules and Discretionin Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986) (arguing for less
discretionary standards than current "best interests" tests); Mnookin, supra note 39, at
226 (criticizing highly discretionary standards and articulating difficulties in formulating
less discretionary rules); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion,Rules and Law: Child Custody
and the UMDA's Best Interest Standard,89 MICH. L. REv. 2215 (1991) (supporting
value ofjudicial discretion in child custody cases while proposing some restrictions).
43. The exact standards vary from state to state. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §
452.410 (1994) (prohibiting modification of custody decrees unless the court finds it is
necessary to serve the best interests of the child based on unknown facts or a change in
circumstances); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-131 (West 1999) (allowing modification
of custody orders ifnew facts show that a change in custody is in the best interests of the
child); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 729 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (allowing modification of
visitation orders at any time ifchange will be in the best interests of the child; prohibiting
modification of custody orders within two years unless enforcement of prior order will
endanger child's physical or emotional health, and after two years if benefit of
modification outweighs harm to child); IDAHO CODE § 32-1115 (1996) (prohibiting
modification of custody decrees within two years unless the present arrangement
seriously endangers the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and after
two years if a permanent material change that warrants modification has occurred); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(1) (1997 & Supp. 1998) (allowing modification of custody
orders within three years only if a material change in circumstances is shown, but no
material change required if modification sought after three years); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.260 (West 1997) (prohibiting modification of custody decrees unless the
court finds "upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or plan or that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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B. Determiningthe Child's Best Interests:
Basic Approaches to a Parent'sHomosexual Relationship
Courts have approached the relevancy of a parent's involvement in a
homosexual relationship under the best interests standard in three ways: 44 (1) by

requiring as a precondition to relevancy a connection, or nexus, between the
parent's conduct and its actual or likely negative impact on the child, (2) by
finding proof of homosexual conduct renders a parent unfit for custody as a
matter of law, or (3) by presuming that placing a child in the custody of a parent
who has been involved in a homosexual relationship will, to some degree,
adversely affect the child's welfare.
Under the more modem approach, the so-called "nexus test," a parent's
homosexual conduct is relevant only to the extent that it affects or is likely to
affect the child's physical, emotional, ormoral well-being. Severaljurisdictions
have endorsed the nexus test explicitly,45 but many others have adhered to its
general principles, at least in certain contexts. 6 In a similar vein, several
were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree or plan, that a substantial
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party and that
the modification is in the best interest of the child and is necessary to serve the best
interests of the child").
44. As Professor Shapiro points out, many scholars and commentators have
identified only two approaches used by courts-nexus tests and per se rules. Shapiro,
supra note 6, at 633-35. She suggests that true per se rules are exceedingly rare and
posits that many courts actually use what she calls a "permissible determinative
inference." Id. at 634-35. Others have identified this third approach as a rebuttable
presumption. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 5, at 889-90.
45. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985); Boswell v.

Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 678 (Md. 1998); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 965 (Sup.
Ct. 1986). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(2) (West 1999) (forbidding
courts to "consider conduct of a party that does not affect that party's relationship to the

child").
46. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1988)
(requiring an affirmative showing of harm or likely harm in order to restrict parental
custody or visitation); Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988)
(construing trial court's order to be concerned with the adverse effects of the mother's
homosexual lover and not her sexual orientation); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538,
542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (requiring evidentiary basis connecting a parent's moral
fitness and the welfare of the child); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 640 (II. App.
Ct. 1993) (recognizing the abrogation of a sexual-orientation-neutral presumption of
harm flowing from a parent's cohabitation in custody disputes and extending the
principle to visitation); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
that the "proper rule" is that homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any
adverse effect upon the child does not render the parent an unfit custodian); Hodson v.
Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (apparently applying nexus test);
Whitehead v. Black, 2 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2593 (Me. June 14, 1976) (same); Bezio v.
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (remanding for new trial when no
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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jurisdictions have found it improper to take judicial notice of any harmful effects
stemming from a parent's homosexual conduct.47
Jurisdictions that explicity follow the second approach, a "per se rule," are
48
rare; Virginia may be the only jurisdiction in which it has continuing vitality.
Under the per se rule, sufficient proof of a parent's conduct disqualifies him or
her from being granted custody despite evidence showing that the behavior does
not affect the child. In Roe v. Roe,49 for example, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that an openly homosexual father's "continuous exposure of the child to his

evidence suggested a correlation between the mother's homosexuality and her fitness as
a parent); In re Marriage of McKay, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658, at *5(Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 16, 1996) (finding trial court abused its discretion by inferring, without
evidentiary basis, that any contact by children with lesbians or homosexuals is per se
harmful); Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997)
(requiring showing that children were exposed to a parent's sexual activity or that the
children were adversely affected by it); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979) (finding trial court erred in changing custody to father when there
was no evidence that the mother engaged in sexual misconduct, that she tried to inculcate
the girls with her sexual attitudes, or that she was a member of a homosexual
organization); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "a
parent's conduct has no relevance to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
in the absence of proof that the parent's conduct has adversely affected the child"); Fox
v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1995) (finding trial court abused its discretion in changing
custody when there was no evidence that the children were adversely affected by the
mother's homosexual behavior); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475, 476 (Or. Ct.
App. 1979) (requiring evidence of harm when parent is engaged in a discreet homosexual
relationship); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (requiring nexus
between conduct and harm when restricting partial custody); Stroman v. Williams, 353
S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (limiting relevancy of parent's morality to what can
be shown to directly or indirectly affect the welfare of the child); Van Driel v. Van Driel,
525 N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (requiring evidentiary link for immoral conduct); see
also M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442, 445 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that mother's
association with an allegedly homosexual man was insufficient to rebut primary caretaker
presumption when no adverse effects on the children were shown).
47. See, e.g., Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 542 (finding grounds for reversible error
when trial court judicially noticed that homosexual environment is not a traditional home
environment and can adversely affect a child); Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1216 (reversing
custody order because it was improper for trial judge to take judicial notice of adverse

affects of raising children in lesbian household).
48. Some courts have reinterpreted older cases that arguably applied a per se rule
to establish only that a presumption of harm exists. For example, a 1979 Illinois
Supreme Court decision seemed to endorse a per se rule when it upheld a trial court's
ruling that a homosexual mother living with her female lover in violation of a fornication
statute inevitably endangered her children's moral development and warranted a change
in custody. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ill. 1979). However, the court
later explicitly declined to interpret Jarrett as establishing a per se rule. See In re
Marriage of Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Il. 1983).
49. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
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immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as
a matter of law,"5 even though the trial court found no evidence that the father's
conduct adversely affected the child and had, as a protective measure,
conditioned the father's custody on his "not sharing a bed or bedroom with any
male lover or friend while the child was present." 5' The Virginia Supreme Court
had
no hesitancy in saying that the conditions under which this child
must live daily are not only unlawful but also impose an
intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation
attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her relationships
with her peers and with the community at large... 52
Consistent with the per se rule, the court awarded the mother sole custody
without addressing her relative fitness, which may have been compromised by
the fact that she had suffered from cancer and had been physically unable to care
for the child for at least two years.53
In jurisdictions that utilize the third approach, such as Missouri, the trier
may presume without evidence in the record that placing a child in the custody
of a parent who has been involved in a homosexual relationship will adversely
affect the child to some degree.54 S.E. G. v. R.A. G.,55 a 1987 Missouri decision,

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

694.
692.
694.
691-92.

54. See J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
Missouri courts presume detrimental impact to a child from a parent's homosexual
conduct); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
it is not necessary in Arkansas to prove that illicit sexual conduct by custodial parent is
harmful to the children because it is presumed); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1,
10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding that "there are sufficient social, moral and legal
distinctions between the traditional heterosexual family relationship and illicit
homosexual relationship to raise the presumption of regularity in favor of the licit, when
established, shifting to the illicit, the burden of disproving detriment to the children");
see also In re J.B.F. v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (reinstating trial
court's order changing custody to father based, in part, on presumed harm resulting from
mother's decision to change her relationship with her lover from a discreet affair in the
guise of roommates to an openly homosexual home environment); Scott v. Scott, 665 So.
2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (opining that when a homosexual parent openly resides
with his or her partner, primary custody with the homosexual parent would rarely be held
to be in the best interests of the child); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 905 (N.C.
1998) (upholding the trial court's conclusion that homosexual father was exposing the
children to unfit and improper influences that would likely create emotional difficulties
despite the fact that evidence only showed that the father was a practicing homosexual
and that no harm was shown to have been inflicted).
55. 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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is illustrative. A mother appealed from a trial court order awarding primary
custody of the parties' four minor children to their father and restricting her
visitation rights. 6 The court originally granted primary custody to the mother,
but it modified the order after receiving evidence that the mother was involved
in a relationship with a woman who resided in another town and drove to the
mother's home several times a week. The two were openly affectionate in front
of the children, and they slept in the same bed when the mother's paramour
stayed overnight.5 7 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's modified
order.5 8 The appellate court asserted that these factors presented "an unhealthy
environment for minor children." 59 In addition, the court indicated that it
believed affirmance would protect the children from the possible peer pressure,
teasing, and ostracizing they might encounter as a result of their mother's
lifestyle. 0
Courts that follow this approach do not find proof of a parent's involvement
in a homosexual relationship renders the parent unfit for custody as a matter of
law, but the trier apparently may presume a significant quantum of harm is likely
to result from placing the child in that parent's custody.6' In some cases, it
seems there may be no practical difference between this approach and a per se
rule. Perhaps the most extreme example can be found in G.A. v. D.A, a 1987
Missouri decision. 2 In G.A. v. D.A., the trial court stated that the fact that the
mother was a lesbian "tipped the scales in favor of [the father]," who received
custody. 3 A divided appellate court affirmed." The majority noted that a
homosexual household is an unhealthy environment, that the mother made no
attempt to conceal the nature of her relationship with her female lover from her
son, and that she had moved seven times between her separation and the custody
trial. The majority did not, however, discuss the relative merits of the home

56. Id. at 165.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 165-66.
60. Id. at 166.
61. The permissible degree of harm a trial judge may presume is a function of the

deference an appellate court is willing to accord to the trial judge's order on appeal. See
infra subpart III(D).
62. 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786,
792-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring homosexual father's visitation be supervised and

noting that Missouri law presumes detrimental impact to a child from a parent's
homosexual conduct and that expert testimony is not necessary basis for determining that
a homosexual influence will adversely affect a child) (citing N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606
S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982)).

63. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 727.
64. Id. at 728.
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environment in which the child actually was placed.6 5 Judge Lowenstein's
dissenting opinion examined both of the child's "limited alternatives., 66 The
mother was not perfect, but
[she] provides the child with his own room in a well kept house,
enrolls him in a pre-school, has a steady nursing job, cares about the
child, and, despite sleeping with and occasionally hugging a woman,
has stated under oath she would discourage her son from emulating
her sexual preference. The father has limited education, an income of
$6500 and lives in basically a one room cabin containing a toilet
surrounded by a curtain; the child sleeps in a foldup cot by a
woodstove and plays in an area littered with Busch beer cans,
collected by the father's "slow" sister, who was ordered by the trial
court not to care for the boy while alone. The 75 year old paternal
grandmother helps care for the little boy.
To say it is in the best interests of this little boy to put him in the
sole custody of the father, who was pictured leering at a girly
magazine, solely on the basis of the mother's sexual preference, would
be and is a mistake.67
C. FactorsInfluencing the Trier: A Review of the Decisions
Unless courts follow a per se rule, the factual circumstances of a particular
case are (or should be) most critical to the trier's decision. 6' Therefore, a review
of the reported decisions is useful to show how triers tend to be influenced by
particular factors and when appellate courts have found these factors improper.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 729 (Lowenstein, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. The nature of the custody claim may be important depending on the particular
statutory scheme. For example, differences may arise if a parent seeks joint or sole
custody of the child because some states employ preferences or presumptions with
respect to joint custody. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375(5) (Supp. 1998) (expressing a
preference for joint physical and legal custody to both parents); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1691 l(a)(5) (1981) (creating a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best
interests of the child); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (1996) (creating presumption that joint
custody is in the best interests of a minor child rebuttable by a preponderance of
evidence); IOWA CODE § 598.41.2b (1999) (same); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (West
1999) (requiring courts to award joint custody unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that one parent should be awarded sole custody or unless the parents agree
otherwise); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.480(3)(a) (1998) (preference for joint custody); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(11) (1992) (presumption affecting burden of proof that joint
legal custody is in the best interests of minor children); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6101(a)(2) (1996) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to contrary if parents agree to
joint custody).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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It is clear that all courts are very concerned when a parent has allowed the
child to see the parent engage in sexual activity or embrace his or her same-sex
partner in the nude.69 When it is shown that the child has actually witnessed this
behavior, the parent's custody claim generally will be denied and visitation
rights restricted.70 Similar outcomes follow when a parent has made homosexual
advances to other minors or has demonstrated other deviant sexual proclivities.7'
Courts begin to differ, however, when they consider whether exposing a
child to relatively benign displays of affection such as hugging or kissing should
be considered harmful 72 or harmless, 73 or whether seeing the parent asleep in bed

69. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (S.D. 1992) (holding that
trial court abused its discretion in awarding mother unsupervised overnight visitation
when evidence showed that mother, who had numerous emotional and psychological
problems, refused to stop a sexual act with another woman when her son walked in and
asked why she was lying on top of the woman, and allowed her two boys to sleep with
her and lover while she was nude); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1981) (affirming change of custody when evidence showed that mother and her
female lover allowed the 5-year-old child in their bed while they embraced each other in
the nude).
70. See Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 893-94 (finding that trial court abused its
discretion in awarding mother unsupervised overnight visitation without first ordering
a home study); Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 391 (affirming change of custody and, sua sponte,
restricting mother's visitation).
71. See In re Marriage of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding
no abuse of discretion in custody award to father when mother exhibited "gross character
defects" by abusing her position as nurse in drug treatment center to begin homosexual
relationship with an underage drug addict); In re Marriage of Teepe, 271 N.W.2d 740,
744 (Iowa 1978) (affiming trial court's decision to award mother custody of 3-year-old
daughter when father had engaged in homosexual conduct, including sex for money, and
had been arrested for exposing himself while wearing a wig and women's clothing in
front of his apartment window); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 643 (Utah 1980)
(finding error when trial court excluded evidence that would have shown mother made

sexual advances to young girl and approached another witness for purpose of trafficking
drugs prior to divorce in determining the restrictions placed on mother's visitation).

72. See Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
joint custody arrangement should have awarded greater custodial time to the father when
mother engaged in "indiscreet displays of affection beyond mere friendship" with another
woman); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (drawing negative
inference from fact that mother was not able to testify with certainty that she and female
lover never kissed or touched affectionately in front of the children); Pulliam v. Smith,
501 S.E.2d 898, 901-02, 904 (N.C. 1998) (noting evidence that father and his partner
kissed on cheek and sometimes on mouth in front ofthe children supported the trial court
finding that the father was exposing the children to unfit and improper influences that
would likely create emotional difficulties); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967 (Okla.
1982) (finding sufficient change of circumstances for modification of custody decree
when mother chose to live in open homosexual relationship which included kissing,
touching, and holding hands in child's presence); Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1218
(Utah 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion when trial court determined that open lesbian
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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with his or her partner should be considered harmful 74 or harmless.7 5 If the child
has demonstrated an inappropriate familiarity with details of homosexual sex, the
parent will certainly lose a custody claim. 6
Several courts analyze the significance of a parent's homosexual
relationship in the same way as they analyze heterosexual affairs,77 but others
scrutinize same-sex affairs more closely. For example, a few courts have
expressed concern when evidence shows a possibility, however remote, that the
child might inadvertently be exposed to some aspect of the parent's homosexual
lovemaking-by wandering into the parent's bedroom at an inappropriate time
or by hearing inappropriate sounds emanating from it.78

cohabitation during marriage and in presence of child sets bad moral example).
73. See In re Marriage of R.S. & S.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1301-03 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (kissing harmless when evidence showed children well adjusted, well groomed,
and doing well in school); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(finding no evidence that seeing two consenting adults hug and kiss in a friendly manner
is harmful to the child); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (noting
homosexual mother's discreet displays not harmful).
74. See Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 WL 491692, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1996) (finding evidence that child had seen mother and female partner sleeping
together supported change of custody to father); Pulliam, 501 S.E.2d at 901 (noting that
evidence that one child observed the father and his partner in bed together supported
change of custody to mother).

75. See M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 966 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding mother
failed to show direct adverse impact of father's homosexuality on 9-year-old son when
she testified that the child had seen father and partner in bed together when evidence did
not indicate anything of a sexual nature had occurred, both men were wearing pajamas,
and the child thought it funny that father's partner was bald).
76. See Ward, 1996 WL 491692, at *2 (finding evidence that 1I-year-old daughter
showed surprising knowledge of sexual activity and vocabulary, played inappropriately
with dolls, and told father's wife about seeing mother and female partner sleeping
together supported trial court's decision changing custody to father); T.C.H., 784 S.W.2d
at 283 (noting evidence that 8-year-old son gave demonstration of "how girls
masturbate," and that he indicated he was familiar with the book, The Joy of Gay Sex,
when he and father were in a bookstore supported trial court award ofprimary custody
to father and temporary custody and visitation to allegedly homosexual mother). See also
Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1995) (describing children's "astonishing
grasp of anatomical terminology" upon their return from visiting their homosexual
mother).
77. See, e.g., Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538, 542-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (citing heterosexual misconduct cases); In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (same); In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (III. App. Ct. 1996)
(describing Illinois's "sexual orientation neutral" approach); Hassenstab v. Hassenstab,
570 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (same).
78. See, e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(describing visitation restrictions on homosexual father as an "attempt to shield a child
of tender age.., from the sexual practices of the visiting parent"); Pulliam v. Smith, 501
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5

16

1999]

Doerhoff: Doerhoff: Assessing the Best Interests of the Child:
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

Although some of the heightened scrutiny may be attributable to general
hostility toward homosexuality, more often the difference seems to stem from
concern that the child might not be able to develop a proper moral character 79 or
a heterosexual gender identity80 if the child is placed with a parent who is openly
involved in a homosexual relationship. These concerns tend to be alleviated,

however, when a parent voluntarily conceals the 8relationship, or when it is
conducted discreetly under the guise of roommates. 1
The reported cases also indicate that virtually all courts tend to be
concerned when evidence shows that the child has begun to experience
significant difficulties in coping with the parent's homosexual identity,
especially when the child has required on-going counseling or has suffered

S.E.2d 898, 901 (N.C. 1998) (quoting trial court order that made specific finding of fact
that father and his male lover's bedroom was a short distance from the child's and was
left unlocked while the father and partner engaged in oral sex); Dailey v. Dailey, 635

S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (pointing to evidence that mother and her lover
made "audible expressions of pleasure and satisfaction" that could be heard in the area
where the child slept).

79. See, e.g., In re J.B.F. v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195 (Ala. 1998) (drawing
negative inference from evidence suggesting child believed "girls can marry girls"); L.
v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (expressing concern that after mother
explained her lifestyle to her children, one child said she saw nothing wrong with it).
80. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (finding error when
trial court failed to consider significance of evidence that child "may have difficulties in
achieving a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the future" when it awarded
custody); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding clear
abuse of discretion when trial court awarded sole custody to homosexual mother when
the child was of an age where his gender identity was being formed); T.C.H. v. K.M.H.,
784 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no error in trial court's award of
primary custody to father when expert testified that there was cause for concem when 8-

year-old son assumed the role of "Gay Ed" while playing with his cousin after having
visited his openly homosexual mother); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980) (finding no error when trial court changed custody based on appellate
court's belief that allowing the child to remain with homosexual mother could result in
sexual disorientation). See also J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (finding no error when trial court restricted homosexual father's visitation

privileges with his 11-year-old son when there was evidence that father advocated a
homosexual lifestyle and thought it would be desirable for son to be homosexual). But
see Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding trial court's
order restricting mother's visitation rights against the weight of the evidence even though
lower court found that mother's relationship with another woman caused child to become
confused as to why he had two mothers).
81. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
("[A]ppellant had never engaged in any physical sexual contact in the children's presence
[but] . . . appellant would be sharing the same bedroom [with her lover] while the

children were with them."); In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (fact in
father's favor that he and partner had separate bedrooms).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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psychological problems. 2 Changes of custody to the heterosexual parent also
tend to be upheld when the child has exhibited behavioral or emotional problems
after living with the homosexual parent,83 but such changes tend to be found
improper when evidence shows the child happy with the arrangement and
otherwise doing well.84

82. See In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(reversing trial court's denial of father's petition to modify custody when children
underwent on-going counseling due to mother's conduct and perception that mother's
lovers were more important to her than her children); Knotts v. Knotts, 693 N.E.2d 962,
966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no abuse of discretion in awarding custody to father
when evidence showed oldest child was "diagnosed with major depression and taking
prozac, when symptoms were caused at least in part by her mother's relationship with
another woman"); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 833-34 (N.D. 1993) (finding
no clear error in trial court's decision not to change primary physical custody from father
to homosexual mother when the children had lived in town where their father lived all
their lives, when the children disliked mother's partner, and when children began having
sleeping problems and experienced depression after learning of their mother's
homosexuality notwithstanding the mother's allegations that children's problems
stemmed from father's bigotry with regard to homosexuals).
83. See Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 WL 491692, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1996) (affirming change of custody to father when evidence showed that
daughter was withdrawn, had poor hygiene and table manners, exhibited behavioral
problems, and preferred to wear men's cologne after living with homosexual mother);
Martins, 645 N.E.2d at 570 (reversing trial court's denial of father's petition to modify
custody when evidence showed that children required counseling to deal with mother's
homosexuality and that children's eating habits and personal hygiene deteriorated).
84. See Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming trial court's denial of father's petition to modify custody because "although
there was evidence that Carol and her partner would engage in sexual activity at times
when Jacqueline was in Carol's residence and that Jacqueline was generally aware of her
mother's homosexual relationship, there was no showing that the daughter was directly
exposed to the sexual activity or that she was in any way harmed by the homosexual
relationship between Carol and her partner" when evidence, including testimony by
father, showed that Jacqueline was a happy, self-assured, and joyful child who was wellkempt and doing well in school); Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1995) (finding trial
court abused discretion in ordering a change of custody from lesbian mother to father
when children were "well-adjusted and happy," mother had a "loving and nurturing
relationship" with them, and there were no signs that the children's school performances,
behavior patterns, or relationships with family or peers had been adversely affected by
the mother's behavior); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying father's petition for change of custody when
evidence showed child was a good student, "'well-behaved,' and 'mannerly"'). But see
N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (dismissing mother's evidence
that child was normal and well adjusted and relying on presumed detrimental impact of
social stigma in affinning trial court's decision granting change of custody from
homosexual mother to father). See also Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849, 855
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming change of custody from homosexual mother to father
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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A parent involved in a homosexual relationship tends to be disfavored when
the parent has included the child in a commitment ceremony 85 or has taken the
child to functions such as gay pride parades.86 This type of conduct is especially
damaging to the parent's claim if there is evidence that it caused the child to
experience emotional distress. In Marlow v. Marlow,87 for example, the father's
claim failed when it was shown the children experienced bed wetting, difficulty
sleeping, and nightmares after the father took them to gay religious services and
social events and discussed in detail his homosexuality with them.88

Courts generally do not favor a parent whose priority is the homosexual

relationship and not the children89 or a parent who has been involved in several
fleeting relationships." Courts disagree, however, whether a parent's open

and speculating that "it may well be that the judge struggled to spare the child as much
future embarrassment as possible").
85. See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing denial of
change of custody when mother had "mock wedding ceremony"); Hertzler v. Hertzler,
908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995) (affirming restriction of mother's visitation rights when
she enlisted children's participation in her lesbian commitment ceremony). See also
Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 901 (N.C. 1998) (affirming exclusive custody award
to mother when father involved children in a party in custodial home in order to celebrate
anniversary with his male partner).
86. See J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding
restrictions that prohibited father from taking children to gay activist social gatherings
and to a church with a largely gay and lesbian congregation); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908
P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995) (gay and lesbian rights parade). But see Pleasant v. Pleasant,
628 N.E.2d 633, 636, 642 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding error in restriction of mother's
visitation rights when, inter alia, there was no evidence that the parties' 5-year-old son
was upset by the gay and lesbian pride parade and when evidence suggested that he
actually enjoyed it, that he did not know what type of parade it was, and that he
remembered only that the people wore colorful shirts).
87. 702 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
88. Id. at 736-37.
89. See, e.g., Bark v. Bark, 479 So. 2d 42, 43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (finding no
abuse of discretion in awarding custody of two minor children to father when mother
began to devote more and more time to female lover, such that burden of child-rearing
shifted to father); Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988) (affirming
custody award to father when children felt mother preferred to spend time with her
female lover); In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(reversing trial court's denial of father's petition to modify custody when children
believed that mother's female lovers were more important to mother than children); Hall
v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d 143, 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming custody award to father
based on evidence that, given a conflict, mother would unquestionably choose
homosexual relationship over children); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 893-94
(S.D. 1992) (finding abuse of discretion when evidence showed mother did not stop
sexual act with another woman to comfort son who was upset after seeing mother lying
on top of her lover).
90. See, e.g., Martins, 645 N.E.2d at 569 (string of roommates and frequent lesbian
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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commitment to one partner is a positive or negative factor. Some courts have
found commitment to be evidence of a stable home environment, 9 but other
courts perceive it to be particularly repugnant. For example, in In re JB.F.v.
92 the Alabama Supreme Court reinstated a trial court judgment granting
J.MF.,
the father's petition to modify custody because there was evidence that the
mother had established a two-parent home environment and had presented it to3

the daughter as the social and moral equivalent of a heterosexual marriage.
With evidence that the child believed "girls can marry girls," the court held that
the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by transferring the girl to her father's
94
custody.
The clearest split of authority pertains to the role other persons' reactions
should play in custody determinations. In several jurisdictions, including
Missouri, courts have placed great emphasis on the possibility that a child may
be ostracized or teased about the parent's homosexual lifestyle95 and have found

house guests); Knotts v. Knotts, 693 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (two
heterosexual affairs and one homosexual affair); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981) (two female lovers); G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (two female lovers since separation from husband); J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d
865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (numerous same-sex relationships since separation from
wife); Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 893 (many homosexual partners); Piatt v. Piatt, 499
S.E.2d 567, 569 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (mother "struggling with her own sexual identity"
and two relationships with women following separation).
91. See, e.g., Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing as
positive factor that mother and partner lived together in stable relationship for 6 years
when facts indicated that mother, in the presence of partner, was a positive influence in
son's life and that child was genuinely fond of mother's partner).
92. 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
93. Id. at 1195 n.3 (basing decision in part on recently approved law that forbids
the issuance of a marriage license in Alabama to parties of the same sex). But see
Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130, 131-32, 134-35 (Wash. 1978) (denying father's
petition to modify custody under similar circumstances even though dissent argued that
mothers were using the children to proselytize the homosexual lifestyle when they
"publicly espoused on radio, television and in lectures the superiority of the homosexual
lifestyle and advertised in a brochure entitled "The Gay Family: A Valid Lifestyle?" in
which they offered interested persons a booklet, "Love is for All," and information about
a film entitled "Sandy and Madeleine's Family").
94. J.B.F., 730 So. 2d at 1196.
95. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirming award of custody to father based in large part on a desire "to protect the
children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may encounter as a
result of the 'alternative life style' their mother has chosen"); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (finding error when trial court awarded custody to mother
because living in the same house with mother and her female lover may cause the
children to "suffer from the slings and arrows of a disapproving society" to a much
greater extent than would if the children were placed in the custody of their father). See
also L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming denial of mother's
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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the potential for social stigmatization a sufficient basis for denying custody, 6 for
requiring a reversal of an award granting custody,97 or for restricting a parent's
visitation privileges severely.9" That a child may experience or has experienced
embarrassment also is a significant factor. 99
Many jurisdictions find these considerations impermissible, but for various
reasons. A few have cited Palmore v. Sidoti,' which held that the Constitution
prohibits private racial biases from being considered in determining whether to
remove a child from a natural parent's custody, as authority for prohibiting
consideration of societal prejudices and biases against homosexuals.' Other
courts have found arguments based on the potential for social condemnation to
be otherwise legally improper"0 2 or legally insufficient 0 3 but some courts have

petition to change custody based in part on evidence that children had been teased about
their mother's lifestyle); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("[W]e have no
hesitancy in saying that the conditions under which this child must live daily are not only
unlawful but also impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her
peers and with the community at large.").
96. See S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166.
97. See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
98. See Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (ordering a "cessation of any visitations in the
father's home or in the presence of his homosexual lover").
99. See Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988) (evidence that
children had concerns regarding the open display of affection between the two women
in the home and hoped their friends would not be exposed to similar displays); Scott v.
Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (evidence that child felt uncomfortable
when kids at school asked why two different women picked him up from after-school
care, and noting that open lesbian relationship far more likely to cause embarrassment
to young children than heterosexual relationship); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581,
584 (Miss. 1999) (evidence that child had been embarrassed when he appeared in public
with his father and partner while they were "here in the South," and definitely would be
embarrassed if their displays of affection occurred in the presence of his friends).

100. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
101. See, e.g., M.A.B. v. RB., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Inscoe v.
Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). But see Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d
733, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting father's argument based on Palmorewhen it was
evident that trial court's decision was not based on private biases but on potential harm
from father's intent to orient the children to the gay lifestyle); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735
S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting mother's argument that Palmoreshould
apply and reasoning that homosexuality is not afforded the same constitutional protection
given to race, national origin, and alienage).
102. See, e.g., M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(explaining that "the law governing grants of custody does not yield to such narrow
considerations").
103. See, e.g., In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297, 1298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(holding that the "potential for social condemnation, standing alone, cannot justify a
change in custody"); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). In Blew, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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found these arguments simply lack merit." 4 In M.P. v. S.P.,'05 for example, the
New Jersey Superior Couit reversed a trial court order granting the father's
petition for a change of custody of his eleven and fifteen year old daughters, who
had been living with their mother for approximately seven years.0 6 In
addressing the father's argument that he should have custody because the
children might be embarrassed about their mother's unconventional lifestyle, the
court reasoned as follows:
Plaintiff's argument overlooks... the fact that the children's
exposure to embarrassment is not dependent upon the identity of
the parent with whom they happen to reside. Their discomfiture,
if any, comes about not because of living with defendant, but
because she is their mother, because she is a lesbian, and because
the community will not accept her. Neither the prejudices of the
small community in which they live nor the curiosity of their
peers about defendant's sexual nature will be abated by a change
of custody. Hard facts must be faced. These are matters which
courts cannot control, and there is little to gain by creating an
artificial world where the children may dream that life is different
than it is.
Furthermore, the law governing grants of custody does not
yield to such narrow considerations. Of overriding importance
is that within the context of a loving and supportive relationship
there is no reason to think that the girls will be unable to manage

court stated:
Courts ought not to impose restrictions which unnecessarily shield children
from the true nature of their parents unless it can be shown that some
detrimental impact will flow from the specific behavior of the parent. The
process of children's maturation requires that they view and evaluate their
parents in the bright light of reality. Children who learn their parents'
weaknesses and strengths may be able better to shape lifelong relationships
with them.... [I]t is preferable for parent-child relationships to be defined by
and developed according to the personalities and character of the child and
parents, unhampered, to the extent possible, by restrictions imposed by the
court.
Id.
104. See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998); M.P., 404 A.2d at
1262-63; M.A.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64.
105. 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
106. Id. at 1257, 1263. The court described the mother as a dutiful, warm, and
loving parent who provided for her children within her means. Id. at 1258-59. In
contrast, the father had exhibited little interest in the children, was $5,000 in arrears on
child support, had carried out "appalling" "sexual onslaughts" on the mother during their
marriage, and the father's new wife had questionable judgment concerning proper
subjects of conversation with the parties' 11-year-old daughter. Id. at 1260, 1262-63.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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whatever anxieties may flow from the community's disapproval
of their mother.'0 7
The court also questioned the validity of the father's argument that he should
have custody because the children's moral welfare would be jeopardized if they
remained with the mother:
If defendant retains custody, it may be that because the
community is intolerant of her differences these girls may
sometimes have to bear themselves with greater than ordinary
fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that their moral
welfare or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to
expect that they will emerge better equipped to search out their
own standards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the
majority is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better
able to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to
the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
Taking the children from defendant can be done only at the
cost of sacrificing those very qualities they will find most
sustaining in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead. Instead of
forbearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will foster in them
a sense of shame for their mother. Instead of courage and the
precept that people of integrity do not shrink from bigots, it
counsels the easy option of shirking difficult problems and
following the course of expedience. Lastly, it diminishes their
regard for the role of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that
we do not forsake those to whom we are indebted for love and
nurture merely because they are held in low esteem by others.0 8
D. The Limited Role ofAppellate Review
Because child-custody adjudication is discretionary and depends so heavily
on the assessment of such subtleties as a party's character and potential parenting
ability, appellate courts are extremely deferential in their review.' 0 9 An order
107. Id. at 1262.
108. Id. at 1263.
109. See Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849, 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (noting

that the trial judge "can detect tenors, tones and flavors that are lost in the bare printed
record read months later by appellate judges"); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949-50
(Wyo. 1995) ("The atmosphere in such cases is generally so charged, the decision so
daunting, and accurate assessment of the character of the contestants so pivotal that we
defer to the superior evidentiary perspective of the district court in custody and visitation
decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion."); see also Leone v. Leone, 917 S.W.2d 608,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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will be disturbed on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion or if no
substantial evidence in the record supports the order."' Even if it is relatively
clear that a trial court allowed its bias against homosexuality to determine the
outcome, most appellate courts affirm the decision."'
Weigand v. Houghton' 2 presents an example of how this rule can operate
to deny parents who have been involved in homosexual relationships the
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated by an unbiased trier. In Weigand,
the Mississippi Supreme Court considered an appeal of a trial court decision that
denied the father's petition for custody modification." 3 The facts indicated that

613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that appellate courts afford greater deference to trial
court decisions in child custody determinations than in other cases and that trial courts
are presumed to have considered all evidence and awarded custody in the best interests
of the child).
An appellate court's willingness to defer to a trial court's ruling sometimes
evaporates when it reviews lower court decisions that favor a homosexual parent. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567,573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (reversing trial
court's denial of change of custody from homosexual mother to father because "the trial
court failed to evaluate fully the impact of the petitioner's lesbianism on the children");
S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing trial court's denial of change
of custody from homosexual mother to father because the trial court failed to consider
sufficiently expert testimony regarding potential social stigma that would bring
"additional burdens to bear in terms of teasing, possible embarrassment and internal
conflicts" and the possibility that child "may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling
heterosexual identity of her own in the future").
Some appellate courts are more successful in restraining their desire to overturn
trial court rulings that favor a homosexual parent. See, e.g., Stroman v. Williams, 353
S.E.2d 704, 707 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming denial of change of custody from
homosexual mother to father partly because, in the words of one judge, "we are not in the
business of gratuitously judging the private lives of other people") (Sanders, C.J.,
concurring); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (affirming award
of primary physical custody to homosexual mother partly because "[p]ersonal
conceptions of morality held by the members of this Court have no place in the resolution
of this controversy").
110. See Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en bane); McDowell
v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
111. See, e.g., D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that
"even if the trial court was wrong in its opinion on the issue of the effect of the wife's
homosexuality as it affected the custody question, such error was not reversible error");
Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 950-52 ("Absent evidentiary underpinnings or persuasive
precedent, we conclude that the district court indulged an essentially personal viewpoint
in derogation of Pamela's lifestyle," but "[i]t was reasonable for the district court to
conclude that limiting Pamela's visitation with the children would limit the damage done
by mutual parental insistence upon use of the children as weapons in an acrimonious
contest between lifestyles."). See also supra notes 62-67 (discussing G.A. v. D.A., 745
S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
112. 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999).
113. Id. at 582, 588.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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the father and mother had shared joint custody of their son for ten years pursuant
to a Kansas divorce decree." 4 The mother had primary physical custody, but the
child spent most of his summer vacations with his father, who lived in California
with his life partner of eight years." 5 The father sought full custody when the
son expressed an interest in moving in with him after witnessing several
incidents of domestic violence by his stepfather against his mother." 6 The son
was greatly disturbed by the stepfather's behavior and had placed a 911
emergency call on one occasion." 7 The mother admitted that her marriage to her
current husband strained her relationship with the child and that her time with
her son was limited since she took a second job to support the family and pay the
stepfather's excessive medical bills after he was seriously injured in an
automobile accident and was unable to work." 8 Despite these problems at home,
however, the son was an "A" student with no behavioral problems." 9
After hearing the evidence, the chancellor denied the father's petition and,
sua sponte, ordered that all visitation between the father and son occur outside
the presence of the father's life partner. 20 The chancellor very clearly was
biased against the father because the father was openly gay.' Nonetheless, the
114. Id. at 583.
115. Id. at 583-84.
116. Id. at 584.

117. Id. at 585.
118. Id. at 584.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 587.
121. One of the two dissenting opinions that were filed included portions of the
Chancery Court's order. This excerpt illustrates that order's basic tenor:
(12) Moral fitness of the parents: It is this factor above all others which
causes the greatest concern with the Court. The natural father is an admitted
homosexual who lives with and engages in sexual activities with another man
on a day-to-day basis.
...

[T]he fact that the Plaintiff and his "life partner" engage in sexual

activity which includes both oral or anal intercourse is repugnant to this Court
as constituting a felony act under the laws of this state.
Under Mississippi law, oral intercourse or fellatio violates the statute.
Further, anal intercourse or sodomy falls within the purview of that statute.

The conscious [sic] of this Court is shocked by the audacity and brashness of
an individual to come into court, openly and freely admit to engaging in
felonious conduct on a regular basis and expect the Court to find such
conduct acceptable, particularly with regards to the custody of a minor child.
The parties are not in Kansas anymore, nor are they in California. Such
conduct is only not [sic] condoned by the Mississippi legislature but is
prohibited and punishable as a serious crime. Further, other statutes within
this state make it clear that the legislative intent for the enforcement of the law
prohibiting unnatural intercourse among other reasons, is for the protection
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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majority affirmed denial of the father's petition instead of remanding for a new
trial as advocated by the three dissenters."' According to the majority, the
chancellor's decision could not be overturned because evidence in the record
showed that some of Mississippi's statutory best-interests factors (school and
community, religious training, and moral fitness) favored the mother and some
(stability of the home and employment) favored the father.'
Thus, the
chancellor was not "manifestly wrong" in denying the father's
petition.
The
24
majority did, however, overturn the visitation restrictions. 1
At least two courts have refused to affirm when presented with a situation
similar to that presented in Weigand. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court reversed a trial court order denying the father's request for extended
visitation with his child in his California home because, although "the findings
and conclusions of law suggest the homosexuality of the father was not the
determining factor the unfortunate and unnecessary references by the trial court
to homosexuality generally indicated the contrary."' 25 Similarly, an Illinois
appellate court reversed a trial court decision that ordered that the mother's

of children. Section 43-15-6 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972 as
amended), prescribes that:
"No person convicted of a crime affecting children or any other
crime as set forth in... Section 97-29-59, Mississippi Code of

1972, relating to unnatural intercourse;... or any other offense
committed in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state,
would be deemed to be such a crime without regard to its
designation elsewhere, shall be licensed as a foster parent or a
foster home by the Mississippi Department of Public
Welfare ....
"
Surely it cannot be argued that conviction for such which would prohibit the
Plaintiff from serving as a foster parent should not likewise prohibit him from

serving as a custodial parent of a child.
Likewise, this Court recognizes the legislative intent of such a statute to be for
the protection of children .... This Court refuses to condone, endorse,
sanction or tolerate homosexual activity in any fashion, mode or manner. To
do so would be to turn a blind judicial eye in the statute promulgated and
enacted by the legislature which was obviously passed with the intent to
protect children. The element of morality must be resolved against the
Plaintiff because of his homosexual activity which, if committed within this
state would constitute felonious conduct, same as it would be resolved had he
openly admitted and confessed to the ongoing sale or distribution of illegal
drugs. This state and particularly this Court is unwilling to accept such
conduct at any time.
Id. at 590-91 (McRae, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 585-87.
123. Id. at 586.

124. Id. at 587.
125. In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983).
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visitation rights be restricted when it was "disturbed" by the judge's numerous
on his personal
homophobic comments which showed he "improperly relied
26
belief that homosexuality creates serious endangerment."'
As these cases also indicate, appellate courts typically examine visitation
restrictions more carefully than they examine denials of custody. 27 Even under
the more stringent review, appellate courts invariably uphold or require severe
restrictions designed to protect children from very unstable persons who also
happen to be homosexual. For example, a parent who suffers from significant
psychological and emotional problems or who has displayed gross deficiencies
1 28
in judgment will likely be denied overnight or unsupervised visitation.
Similarly, a parent will almost certainly be prohibited from visitation in the
presence of a same-sex partner who poses a significant threat to the child's wellbeing. 29 Appellate courts also commonly uphold restrictions prohibiting a

126. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 642 (Ili. App. Ct. 1993).

127. See supranote 36 for a discussion of the widely recognized parental right to
visitation that generally can be restricted or denied only if visitation would endanger a
child. See also supranote 5 for a discussion of the fundamental right of parents to raise
and care for their children.
128. See Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1992) (remanding
visitation issue because trial court should have ordered a home study before awarding
unsupervised visitation to homosexual mother who had myriad problems, including an
eating disorder and depression, had made several suicide threats, was sexually abused as
a child, had many sexual encounters during her marriage, and took her children to gay
bars); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 643 (Utah 1980) (reversing because trial court
should have considered evidence that homosexual mother trafficked drugs and made
sexual advances to another minor child prior to awarding overnight visitation); see also
North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (noting trial court was
not unreasonable in denying overnight and extended visitation to Baptist minister father
who had engaged in homosexual activities during marriage, contracted HIV, withheld
this information from his wife, and continued to have unprotected sex with her for three
months, but remanding because the trial court order did not follow logically from its
factual findings and had no reasonable relationship to its announced objective).
129. See Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950-51 (Conn. 1988)
(discussing order that prohibited homosexual mother from exercising visitation in the
presence of female lover who was emotionally unstable, had been twice institutionalized
for schizophrenia, attempted suicide, and had yelled at and slapped the children); In re
Marriage of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that trial
court correctly considered evidence that mother's female lover abused drugs, had been
sexually abused as a child, and had significant emotional problems in determining
custody because lover proposed to help raise child in formative years); see also Hodson
v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]e caution Shawn that
although we find her best able to minister to Jeremiah's needs we have deep concerns
about the wisdom of sharing her family home with a recovering alcoholic that
characterizes herself as a social drinker and who appears to lack maturity as well as
respect for the governing laws.").
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parent from involving the child in gay and lesbian events, especially when the
child has experienced distress after attending similar functions.' 3
When restrictions appear aimed at limiting a child's contact with a parent
or other person because he or she is open about a same-sex relationship, the
decisions reach different results depending on how much harm to the child an
appellate court is willing to presume flows from contact with persons involved
in such relationships. It is not uncommon for appellate courts to overturn these
restrictions when they are insufficiently supported by the evidence,' 3 ' are more
restrictive than necessary to shield the child
from harm,' 32 or when other
33
remedies such as counseling are possible.

130. See, e.g., Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming restrictions prohibiting homosexual father from having any other non-blood
related person in the house overnight when the children are present and from including
children in any social, religious, or educational functions that promote the homosexual
lifestyle when children had experienced emotional distress after having attended prior
activities); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming
visitation restrictions prohibiting overnight visitation and taking son to "gay activist
social gatherings" and a homosexual church when father advocated homosexual lifestyle
and son experienced increased bed wetting after having attended prior functions). See
also Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (App. Div. 1985) (affirming restriction
that father not involve the daughter in any homosexual activities or publicity when father
had advertised for homosexual lover in the "Village Voice").
131. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1988)
(removing restrictions because the "unconventional lifestyle of one parent, or the
opposing moral positions of the parties, or the outright condemnation of one parent's
beliefs by the other parent's religion, which may result in confusion for the child, do not
provide an adequate basis for restricting visitation rights"); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628
N.E.2d 633, 639-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that trial judge "improperly relied on
his personal belief that homosexuality creates serious endangerment" and that trial
judge's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence); Boswell v. Boswell,
721 A.2d 662, 678 (Md. 1998) (discussing the need for factual finding of harm which
"requires that the court focus on evidence-based factors and not on stereotypical
presumptions" in imposing restrictions); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475, 476
(Or. Ct. App. 1979) (finding nothing in the record to justify provision that restricted
lesbian mother's visitation rights by prohibiting her visitation to be conducted in the
presence of any lesbians).
132. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (App. Div.
1986) (finding court abused its discretion in imposing conditions on the custody award
that restricted mother's right to maintain lifestyle well beyond that which was necessary
to protect child from reasonably predictable effects of her lesbian relationship). See also
Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (excising visitation restriction that conditioned father's
visitation privileges on the exclusion of his male lover because it could only be
interpreted as punitive measure against the father when 7-year-old daughter knew that
father had male live-in lover because she lived in same apartment building).
133. See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 673 (Md. 1998) (finding that
evidence that children were confused by father's new relationship was an insufficient
basis to restrict his visitation when counseling could alleviate the problem); In re
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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On the other hand, there are extreme examples of appellate courts
upholding severe restrictions despite weak evidentiary bases. 34 In J.P.v.P. .,
for example, a Missouri appellate court upheld an order restricting a father's
visitation to supervised-only, even without evidence indicating that the father's
homosexual conduct caused or would likely cause physical or emotional harm
to the child. 35 In Pascarellav. Pascarella,a Pennsylvania superior court upheld
restrictions limiting a father's visitation from occurring outside the children's
paternal grandparent's residence or in the presence of his male partner because
the children were unaware of their father's sexual preference and because it was
"inconceivable that they could go into that environment, be exposed to this
relationship and not suffer some emotional disturbance, perhaps severe." '36
Without discussion, a number of reviewing courts have deleted restrictions they
deemed too severe, usually when it appeared the trial court was biased. 37
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Before reaching the merits, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the
Rule 84.04(d) violations alleged in F.J.D.'s motion to strike. 38 The court held

Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652, 656 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (overturning visitation
restrictions because the children's problems stemmed from difficulties adjusting to
father's homosexuality and the trial court did not fully consider whether to order
counseling before entering improper restrictions).
134. See, e.g., Pennington v., Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (affirming, over one dissent, restrictions on homosexual father's visitation
prohibiting him from exercising overnight visitation in presence of his male roommate
even though the restrictions were based on trial court's belief that the father's roommate,
who did not testify at trial, would be harmful to the child and even though the mother
testified that she had never observed any improprieties between the father and his
roommate); J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming
restrictions denying overnight visitation privileges and limiting father's visitation rights
by prohibiting him from taking the child to gay activist social gatherings based on fact
that father lived with homosexual lover despite uncontradicted expert testimony that less
restrictive visitation would not harm the child). See also Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d
391, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (raising issue of mother's unrestricted visitation at its
own discretion and prohibiting mother's visitation from being made in the home where
she was living with female partner and/or in the presence of any female lover).
135. J.P. v. P.W, 772 S.W.2d 786, 794-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Prewitt, J.,
dissenting).
136. Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
137. See In re Marriage of Wiarda, 505 N.W.2d 506, 508-09 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)
(finding, without discussion, that the trial court's visitation restrictions were too severe
and modifying them by giving mother the right to four weeks visitation in her home
during the summer); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 587 (Miss. 1999) (similar).
138. 978 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. 1998). As a reference point for this discussion,
the court indicated that the need for rule-conforming briefs relates to an appellate court's
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that both of J.A.D.'s points alleging errors in the trial court's custody
determination were so deficient that they could be reviewed only for plain
error. 3 9 The supreme court concluded that the trial court did not plainly err in
applying Missouri's best interests standard to the evidence at trial. The supreme
court also found that the trial court did not determine custody solely based on
J.A.D.'s homosexual status because the trial court decision indicated several
40
other reasons for placing the children with their father.1
While emphasizing that the best interest of the child is the guiding principle
in custody adjudication and that a homosexual parent is not ipso facto unfit, the

function as a court of review: an opportunity to examine asserted error in the trial court.
Id. According to the court, a party failing to adequately advise the reviewing court of an
asserted error places the court on the horns of a dilemma: If the court decides the merits
based on inadequate advocacy, it risks establishing ill-considered precedent; if the court
performs additional research to make up for the deficiency, it impermissibly advocates
for the party. Id. Due to a policy of deciding cases on the merits, however, the court
stated that a defective point is considered unless it is so deficient that it fails to give
notice to the court or other parties of the issue presented on appeal. If so, the court may
disregard the point, review it for plain error, or dismiss the appeal. Id. As a final
preliminary matter regarding the sufficiency of a point, the court stated that it must meet
three requirements: "(1) it must state the trial court's action or ruling about which the
appellant complains; (2) it must state why the ruling was erroneous; and (3) it must state
what was before the trial court that supports the ruling appellant contends should have
been made." Id. (citing Murphy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 955 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997)).
139. Id. at 339 (citing Mo. R. CIV. P. Rule 84.13(c), which allows plain errors
affecting substantial rights to be considered when there is manifest injustice or a
miscarriage of justice).
With respect to the first point,which alleged that the trial court erred in awarding
the father sole custody because the evidence showed the mother was the better choice,
the court found it was inadequate because it failed to state what was before the trial court
that would have supported J.A.D.'s contention, and the related argument portion of the
brief failed to supply the deficiency. Id.
For two reasons, the court found facially defective J.A.D.'s second point, which
alleged unspecified constitutional violations stemming from the custody determination,
the court-ordered "telling" session, and visitation restrictions. Id. The point failed to
state what evidence before the trial court would have supported J.A.D.'s contention, and
it failed to specify which constitutional provisions were claimed to have been violated.
Id.
140. Id. The court pointed to paragraph 19 of the custody order which read:
19. The best interests of the minor children will be met by their custody being
placed with [F.J.D.] because of: (a) [F.J.D.'s] greater stability; (b) [J.A.D.'s]
negativism toward [F.J.D.] and it's [sic] negative impact on the children; (c)
[J.A.D.'s] immaturity in seeking after repeated new love relationships and
enmeshing her children's lives in her lover's lives; (d) [F.J.D.'s] nearby close
extended family; and (e) [F.J.D.'s] greater likelihood of promoting a good
relationship between the children and the other parent.
Id. at 337.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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court also stated that it "is not error to consider the impact of homosexual or
heterosexual misconduct upon the children in making a custody
determination."''
Because substantial evidence supported
the custody
1 42
determination, the court also affirmed this part of the order.
The court then turned to the "telling" session and visitation restriction
issues. The court held that the former was moot because the session had already
taken place, but that the latter had merit because the restrictions were too
broad.14 ' Because restrictions prohibiting the children from being in the presence
of any known lesbians (with the exception of one long-time friend of the
children) or any unrelated female with whom J.A.D. might be living would apply
to persons who might not be harmful to the children, the court reversed and
directed the trial court on remand to limit the conditions to 144
persons whose
presence might be contrary to the best interests of the children.
V. COMMENT

Because of the procedural context ofJ.A.D. v. F.J.D.,145 it may be tempting
to read into the opinion both a tacit rejection of a nexus test and an implicit
approval of prior Missouri decisions.146 Such a reading, however, would be a
mistake. Clearly, the Missouri Supreme Court felt constrained by technical
errors in J.A.D.'s brief, and its plain error review makes it difficult to glean
anything definitive on these issues. 47 What is indisputable is that the court
declared that homosexual parents are not ipso facto unfit custodians of their
children. Further, the opinion emphasizes that the child's best interest is the

141. Id. at 339.
142. Id. at 340.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
146. The court decided without a single reference to any of the seven custody
decisions involving the parental homosexuality issue decided since 1980, which may
indicate that the court did not consider any of them controlling. The only authority cited
with respect to homosexual parents and custody determinations was a decision that
addressed the relationship of the common law marital communications privilege and the
admissibility of evidence in a custody hearing. See J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336,
340 (Mo. 1998) (citing T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Mo. 1985) (en

banc)). The underlying facts in T.C.H. v. KMH did pertain to a custody dispute
involving a homosexual parent, but a final determination had not been reached. When

the final determination was reached, it was appealed in T.C.H. v. KMH., 784 S.W.2d
281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).

147. See Lisa Brunner, Circumventingthe "BestInterests of the Child" Standard:
Child Custody Law in Missouri as Applied to Homosexual Parents,55 J.Mo. B. 200
(1999) (suggesting that the court seemed to advocate a nexus test when it analyzed the
limitations on J.A.D.'s visitation but that it otherwise appeared to recognize a
presumption-of-harm approach in custody determinations).
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fundamental concern in custody adjudication. This seems to be meant as a signal
to judges who in practice may have viewed parents who had been involved in
same-sex relationships as unfit even if the judges did not explicitly follow a per
se rule. 4 '

Whether the Missouri Supreme Court will take the next logical step and
adopt a nexus test that requires an evidentiary connection between the parent's
conduct and its actual or likely negative impact on the child remains
unanswered. Thus, it seems fruitful to explore the reasons for and against
adopting the test. Section 452.375 of the Missouri Revised Statutes is the natural
starting point for analysis because it articulates the public policy considerations
underlying custody determinations and gives content to Missouri's best interests
standard. In part, it provides:
The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public
policy of this state that frequent, continuing and meaningful
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage is in the best interest of the child, except
for cases where the court specificallyfinds that such contact is
not in the best interest of the child, and that it is the public policy
of this state to encourage parents to participate in decisions
affecting the health, education and welfare of their
children .... 149

Stated another way, unless a child requires protection, Missouri's public policy
minimizes state interference with parent-child relationships beyond what is
necessary to accommodate the fact that the child's parents have established
separate households. For courts considering whether to make a custody award
that limits parent-child contact more than minimally necessary, this statute
appears to call for evidence particular to the child's circumstances that shows
less restricted parent-child contact does or is likely to affect the child's welfare

148. See Delong v. Delong, No. WD52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *6-*11 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 1998) (reviewing the Missouri decisions since 1980 and concluding that
Missouri courts appeared to have applied a per se rule against homosexual parents when
awarding custody); Cox, supra note 6, at 792 (reaching same conclusion).
149. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375(4) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Missouri's

public policy is consistent with cases recognizing the fundamental liberty interest of
parents in maintaining relationships with their children. See supra note 5.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5
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adversely. 5 ° Any lesser evidence seems inadequate to justify the additional
state interference.
A nexus test seems eminently suited to effectuate the policy behind the best
interests standard. The question therefore arises whether the approach taken by
Missouri courts prior to J.A.D. v. F.J.D. can be reconciled with this policy. If
not, the nexus test would appear to provide a sounder approach. As discussed
in subparts I1(B) and II(C) of this Note, prior to J.A.D. v. F.J.D., Missouri
courts invariably seemed to presume that placing a child in the custody of a
parent who had been involved in a homosexual relationship would not be in the
child's best interests.' Specifically they presumed that placing the child in the
parent's custody would impair development of the child's moral character" 2 or
heterosexual gender identity'53 or that it would subject the child to social
ostracism.'54 Unless these inferences are corroborated by some statutory
provision or are otherwise well supported by evidence, the best interests of the
child may not be served by allowing courts to indulge them.
With respect to the first issue, nothing in the statutory chapter governing
divorce and custody suggests that the Missouri legislature has considered this
social policy question. 5 and resolved it against a parent who has been involved
in a same-sex relationship. Indeed, the statutory best-interests factors do not
even list parental sexual behavior as a factor to be considered apart from its
relationship to the child's welfare. Nor does anything in other chapters sustain
the approach taken in the earlier decisions. No provision arguably relevant to
the child custody question singles out persons who have engaged in homosexual
behavior simply because the behavior is homosexual.'56

150. See Section 452.375(5), which lists in order of preference the potential
custody arrangements that should be considered by the court. At the top of the list is an
award ofjoint physical and legal custody, which is followed by awards ofjoint physical
custody with one party granted sole legal custody, joint legal custody with one party
granted sole physical custody, and sole custody to one parent respectively. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.375(5) (Supp. 1998). Considered in conjunction with the portion of Section
452.375 quoted above, this paragraph suggests that stronger and stronger evidence of
actual or potential harm emanating from a parent's contact with the child must be shown
in order to justify less and less favored custody arrangements.
151. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text; see also Delong v. Delong,
No. WD52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *6-*10 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998) (discussing in
depth each of the seven Missouri appellate cases decided since 1980).
152. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
155. How courts approach the parental homosexuality issue under the best interests
standard primarily "involves a fundamental policy question concerning the foundational
relations of society," which generally is a matter reserved to legislative branch. Wardle,
supra note 6, at 896. In most instances, the constitutional rights of parents will not play
a primary role. See supra note 5.
156. As Judge Uhich has pointed out, Missouri recognizes the marital relationship
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Second, the premise that a child inevitably will be harmed by being placed
in the custody of a parent involved in a homosexual relationship is dubious at
best. Recent social science studies have concluded unanimously that the

psychosocial development of a child will not be compromised if the child is
raised by a parent who, regardless of his or her sexual preference, can provide
a nurturing home environment and has demonstrated good parenting skills.'57

between a man and a woman only, and a reasonable inference of this expression ofpublic
policy is that the "desired environment for propagating and rearing children is within the
sanctioned relationship of marriage between both naturalparents." Delong, 1998 WL
15536, at n.4 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (1994)) (emphasis added). Some may
argue, however, that this provision simply indicates a preference for raising children in
a heterosexual household, and thus the parent who will likely reestablish such a
household after divorce should be given custody in favor of other parent. This argument
does not validate the assumptions made by the courts prior to JA.D. v. F.J.D. Whatever
weak preference for a heterosexual household Section 451.022 may indicate, it is
superseded by the policies expressed in Section 452.375, which demand that the courts
make custody awards that foster a child's relationship with both parents.
157. Charlotte J. Patterson, Children ofLesbian and Gay Parents,63 CHILD DEV.
1025, 1036 (1992); see also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 650 n.153 (finding, after reviewing
the literature, that "there are no reported negative effects on children resulting directly
from their parent's sexual orientation") (citing J. Michael Bailey et al., Sexual
OrientationofAdult Sons of Gay Fathers,29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 124 (1995);
Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: PsychosocialAssumptions in FamilyLaw, 44 AM.
PSYCHOL. 941 (1989); David K. Flaks et al., Lesbians Choosing Motherhood: A
Comparative Study of Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents and Their Children, 31
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 105 (1995); Elizabeth D. Gibbs, PsychosocialDevelopment
of Children Raisedby Lesbian Mothers: A Review of Research, 8 WOMEN & THERAPY
65 (1989); Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-ParentHouseholds:
Psychosexual and PsychiatricAppraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551
(1983); Julie S. Gottman, Children of Gay andLesbian Parents,14 MARRIAGE & FAM.
REV. 177 (1989); Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A
Comparisonwith Solo ParentHeterosexualMothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 167 (1986); Richard Green, Sexual Identity of37 ChildrenRaised by
Homosexual or TranssexualParents,135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978); Beverly
Hoeffer, Children'sAcquisition of Sex-Role Behavior in Lesbian-MotherFamilies, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 536 (1981); Mary E. Hotvedt & Jane B. Mandel, Children of
Lesbian Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
ISSUES 275 (William Paul et al. eds., 1982); Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study
of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced
HeterosexualMothers, 18 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 123, 132-33 (1989); Martha Kirkpatrick
et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Study, 51 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (1981); Karen G. Lewis, Children ofLesbians: Their Point of
View, 25 Soc. WORK 198 (1980); Laura Lott-Whitehead & Carol T. Tully, The Family
Lives of Lesbian Mothers, 63 SMITH C. STUD. SOC. WORK 265, 265 (1993); Ann
O'Connell, Voicesfrom the Heart: The Development Impact of a Mother's Lesbianism
on Her Adolescent Children, 63 SMITH C. STUD. Soc. WORK 281 (1993); Charlotte J.
Patterson, Children of the Lesbian Baby Boom: BehavioralAdjustment, Self-Concepts,
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These scientific conclusions are consistent with other Missouri case law, which
also indicates that a good environment and stable home are the most important
considerations in custody matters.' 8 Even if some scientists have overstated the
significance of their results, as Professor Lynn Wardle has argued,1 59 courts that
made assumptions unsupported by scientific literature or by legislative policy
declarations were treading on shaky ground.
Third, although it may be laudable for judges to be concerned about a
child's exposure to peer or community condemnation, their efforts in this area
may have been misguided, for several reasons. As M.P. v. S.P. eloquently
explained, the assumption that teasing will always jeopardize a child's moral
welfare is questionable, as is the assumption that denying custody to a parent
who has been involved in a homosexual relationship will always protect the
child from being teased, particularly when both parents decide to remain in the
same community after divorce.1 6' Furthermore, remedies like court-ordered
counseling can better ameliorate these sorts of problems and help ensure that
parent-child relationships survive and flourish over the long term.
In short, prior to J.A.D. v. F.J.D., Missouri courts appear to have made
assumptions about the relevancy of a parent's involvement in a homosexual
relationship that were not supported by legislative directives, by the weight of
social science data, or by universally applicable postulates. If the decisions in
these cases were without other competent evidentiary basis, the resultant
custody awards may have interfered impermissibly with parent-child
relationships. To prevent such consequences in future custody determinations,
the Missouri Supreme Court should consider adopting a nexus test if it is
presented with an opportunity to do so.
If the court adopts a nexus test, the test would alleviate a number of other
problems that arise when courts presume harm from homosexual behavior. For
example, adoption of a nexus test would facilitate appellate review and offer
children greater protection from biased or misguided triers. Because trial courts
were not required to articulate how a parent's sexual conduct affected the
child's welfare, attempts to obtain meaningful appellate review were easily
frustrated prior to J.A.D. v. F.J.D. The trial court had only to say that evidence
of the parent's behavior "tipped the scales" in its custody determination, and the
6
appellate court was required to draw all favorable inferences from the record.1 '

and Sex Role Identity, in LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY 156 (Beverly Greene &
Gregory M. Herek eds.,1994); Charlotte J. Patterson, Families of the Lesbian Baby
Boom: Parent'sDivision of Labor and Children's Adjustment, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 115 (1995); Charlotte J. Patterson, Sexual Orientation and Human
Development: An Overview, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1995)).

158. See D.K.L. v. L.C.L., 764 S.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); M. v.
M., 688 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
159. See Wardle, supra note 6.

160. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
161. See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) discussed supra notes
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As a practical matter, this gave trial judges free rein to limit a child's contact
with a parent for legally insubstantial reasons. When a trial court decides under
a nexus test, however, the appellate court can review the trial court's
particularized reasons based on evidence and can determine whether they
withstand scrutiny. Adopting the test will provide moderate restraint on trial
court discretion' that will not interfere with the trial court's ability to formulate
an order suited to the child's unique circumstances, and it will give the parties
a better chance at framing the issues on appeal other than as "generalized pleas"
for the appellate court to decide the dispute differently than the trial court.
Another shortcoming a nexus test might remedy pertains to the appearance
of injustice. If a court issues a custody determination that disfavors a parent
who has been involved in a homosexual relationship and the court's reasons are
not linked to the evidence, the court risks appearing biased even if its ultimate
award is, in an objective sense, consistent with the best interests of the child.
When a court is bound by a nexus test, it will articulate the reasons for its
decision more clearly. A nexus test could therefore help promote confidence
in the judicial system by better satisfying the litigants and the public that the
case was decided according to a rule of law, and not a rule of men. 63
Finally, a nexus test may actually promote better trial court decision
making. As Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit has pointed out in another
context, reasoned decisions "impose a discipline on judges" and ensure more
thoughtful determinations."6 When courts may simply presume harm, they are
not forced to critically assess how the parent's actions relate to the child's
welfare. Encouraging courts to engage in critical analysis seems particularly
important in these custody battles where one parent may be preoccupied with
what usually is newly discovered sexual behavior and where testimony about
this behavior frequently comprises a disproportionate amount of the evidence.
Perhaps because the parties are preoccupied, judges who may presume harm
tend to focus on evidence about the parent's homosexual conduct and fail to
adequately consider evidence about the other parent. 6 The nexus test may also

62-67 and accompanying text.
162. But see Shapiro, supra note 6, at 641-646 (arguing that nexus tests fail to
accomplish their purposes in many jurisdictions because courts engage in or permit
speculation about potential future harm rather than confining the inquiry to harm that is

proven or reasonably likely to occur and because what constitutes "harm" is often
undefined, leaving trial judges "free to identify wide-ranging and ill-defined harms,
including stigma and moral injury, without engaging in any careful analysis").
163. See Christopher L. Kutz, JustDisagreement. Indeterminacy andRationality
in the Rule ofLaw, 103 YALE L. J. 997, 1022 (1994) (arguing that the rule of law requires

that "all grounds for a decision be displayed in the judicial opinion, so that the
justificatory argument can be subject to public disagreement, dissent, and correction").
164. See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed
Bureaucracyor Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768 (1983).
165. See Delong v. Delong, No. WD52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *11 (Mo. Ct. App.
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mitigate this problem because it limits the admissibility of some testimony:
Evidence about a parent's homosexual behavior is relevant only to the extent
that it could be shown to affect or to be likely to affect the child's physical,
emotional, or moral well-being. With less distraction by irrelevant evidence or,
worse still, by unfounded prejudice, judges may be more inclined to
thoughtfully consider the relative merits of both parents and less inclined to
restrict the child's contact with either parent.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Missouri Supreme Court held that homosexual parents are not
ipso facto unfit for custody of their children, it appeared to be sending a signal
to judges who may in practice have viewed these parents as per se unfit.
Whether the court will formally adopt the more modem nexus test remains to
be seen. Until the court has the opportunity to consider the issue directly,

Missouri courts should adhere to the policy behind the best interests standard

by thoughtfully weighing the relative merits of both parents' skills and
characteristics and by considering a parent's involvement in a homosexual
relationship only when evidence suggests it has affected or is likely to affect the
child adversely. Only then will the courts succeed in fulfilling their obligations
to determine custody arrangements in the best interests of the children.
HEIDI C. DOERHOFF

Jan. 20 1998) (noting that in prior cases, Missouri courts "frequently" upheld custody
awards disfavoring the homosexual parent "without substantial evidence of the
environment presented for the child by the heterosexual parent"). The Pennsylvania
Superior Court has also witnessed this phenomenon. See Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). Prior cases placed the burden on a homosexual parent to disprove
detriment to children as a prerequisite for custody. In Barron, the trial court awarded
joint legal custody of 6-year-old daughter and primary physical custody to father. Id. at
682. The mother appealed, claiming a remand was necessary because the trial court's
credibility determination relative to father's drinking problem was unsupported. Id. at
686. The appellate court agreed. Id. at 688. According to the appellate opinion, the trial
court was greatly concerned about the psychological effects the mother's homosexuality
might have on the daughter, but it failed to consider certain more relevant characteristics
of the father: "We are also deeply troubled by the trial court's utter failure to address the
effect of father's drinking on his ability to provide adequate care for Christine." Id. at
686. "In addition to mother's testimony, father's own friends testified that father was
prone to drink intoxicating beverages to the point of getting verbally abusive or falling
We do not understand why the trial court did not perceive this as a significant
asleep ....
[T]here was uncontradicted testimony that the excessive drinking went on in
factor ....
the child's presence and on at least two occasions father had passed out when he was the
sole caretaker of Christine." Id. at 686-87.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 5

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/5

38

